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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The growth of criminal gangs and organized crime groups
has created unprecedented challenges in Central America.
Homicide rates are among the highest in the world, countries
spend on average close to 10 percent of GDP to respond to
the challenges of public insecurity, and the security forces
are frequently overwhelmed and at times coopted by the
criminal groups they are increasingly tasked to counter.
With some 90 percent of the 700 metric tons of cocaine
trafficked from South America to the United States passing
through Central America, the lure of aiding illegal traffickers
through provision of arms, intelligence, or simply
withholding or delaying the use of force is enormous.
These conditions raise the question: to what extent are
militaries in Central America compromised by illicit ties to
criminal groups? The study focuses on three cases:
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. It finds that:
 Although illicit ties between the military and criminal
groups have grown in the last decade, militaries in these
countries are not yet “lost” to criminal groups.
 Supplying criminal groups with light arms from military
stocks is typical and on the rise, but still not common.
 In general the less exposed services, the navies and air
forces, are the most reliable and effective ones in their
roles in interdiction.
 Of the three countries in the study, the Honduran military
is the most worrying because it is embedded in a context
where civilian corruption is extremely common, state
institutions are notoriously weak, and the political system
remains polarized and lacks the popular legitimacy and
political will needed to make necessary reforms.
 Overall, the armed forces in the three countries remain
less compromised than civilian peers, particularly the
police.

However, in the worsening crime and insecurity context,
there is a limited window of opportunity in which to
introduce measures targeted toward the military, and such
efforts can only succeed if opportunities for corruption in
other sectors of the state, in particular in law enforcement
and the justice system, are also addressed.
Measures targeted toward the military should include:
 Enhanced material benefits and professional education
opportunities that open doors for soldiers in promising
legitimate careers once they leave military service.
 A clear system of rewards and punishments specifically
designed to deter collusion with criminal groups.
 More effective securing of military arsenals.
 Skills and external oversight leveraged through
combined operations, to build cooperation among those
sectors of the military that have successful and clean
records in countering criminal groups, and to expose
weaker forces to effective best practices.
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INTRODUCTION
Daily news reports capture the growing scale of violence in
Central America. Homicide rates in the region have
skyrocketed in the Northern Triangle countries of El
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, with the most dramatic
increase, in Honduras, literally doubling the country‟s
murder rate over the last five years from 43 to 86 per
100,000 inhabitants – now the highest in the hemisphere.1
The economic costs of crime in the region are also
astounding, ranging between 8 and 11 percent of GDT in
terms of expenditures on law enforcement, private security,
and healthcare.2 Behind these trends are established criminal
gangs and the growing competition among organized crime
groups, particularly as Mexico-based cartels have shifted
their operational control further “upstream” into Central
America to capture greater profits and take advantage of
significant weaknesses to a greater or lesser extent
throughout the region: weak state institutions, corrupt public
officials, and national territories where security forces are
undermanned and insufficiently monitored are central factors
contributing to the growth of organized crime in the region.
As a result, according to U.S. government estimates, by 2011
some 90 percent of the 700 metric tons of cocaine trafficked
from South America to the United States was passing
through Central America – up from 42 percent in 2008 and
60 percent in 2010.3
1

Estimate for 2011 by the National Commission for Human Rights
(CONADEH) in Honduras, compared with the figure for 2006. By
comparison, in the United States the homicide rate is about 5 per
100,000.
2
The World Bank, Crime and Violence in Central America: A
Development Challenge (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2011),
p. 7.
3
The White House, Presidential Determination No. 2011-16 on Major
Illicit Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal
Year 2012, September 15, 2011; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of
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With Central American governments increasingly unable to
provide a reassuring degree of public security for their
citizens or to effectively stem the overwhelming flow of
drugs through the region, they have brought the armed forces
into the fight. Currently, every military in Central America
is involved in counterdrug operations to some extent,
whether as backup for police units or through interdiction of
air- and sea-trafficked contraband. Military forces clearly
bring added capabilities that police forces lack.4 Still, it is
not clear that bringing the military into on-the-ground
operations against criminal groups is worth the risk of
exposing them more directly to potential cooptation by
criminal groups – unless the use of military force is carefully
calibrated to the task and combined with a range of wellcoordinated, long-term security sector and judicial reforms.
In most cases, when the military is brought in, it has to come
up from behind. For instance, in Guatemala, the region‟s
long-time epicenter of criminal groups trafficking children,
migrants, cars and arms as well as drugs, the total value of
goods seized by authorities in 2009 equaled 5.4 percent of
GDP, compared with State spending on security at only 1.2
percent of GDP.5 What is more, break-out groups like the

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, International Narcotics
Control Strategy (INCSR), 2010 and 2011 reports, indexed at
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.
4
For instance, as numerous civilian security experts and some military
officers interview for this project noted, compared with police forces the
military typically not only has greater firepower, but also a round-theclock mission orientation and a tied-to-the-barracks location, whereas
police forces typically quit when their shift is over and go home to
civilian lives that are often in the same communities where criminal
groups operate.
5
Julie López, “Guatemala‟s Crossroads: The Democratization of
Violence and Second Chances,” in Cynthia J. Arnson and Eric L. Olson,
eds., Organized Crime in Central America: The Northern Triangle
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2011), p. 186. This article

4

Zetas have been able to stay one step ahead of conventional
military forces by recruiting members from Mexican and
Guatemalan army Special Forces to their ranks.
Illicit ties, which involve active duty members of the military
in active or passive collusion with criminal groups, are
developing more frequently. There have been numerous
high-profile instances of arms mysteriously disappearing or
being stolen from military stockpiles in El Salvador,
Guatemala and Honduras, only to turn up later in the hands
of criminal groups. As a result, virtually every grenade
attack by the Salvadoran Mara gangs has involved U.S.issued M-67 grenades, and U.S.-issued anti-tank weapons
that disappeared from Honduran stockpiles were later found
in an arms cache in drug violence torn Juarez, Mexico. In
2010, in a spectacular theft from a Honduran military hangar,
an airplane confiscated in a counterdrug operation was flown
away before military forces reached the scene.
Cases like these raise the crucial question: to what extent are
militaries in Central America compromised by illicit ties to
criminal groups? This question drives the research laid out
in this paper, which draws on reports by government
agencies, the news media, and non-governmental
organizations; and over 30 in-country personal interviews
with government officials, academics and policy experts, and
members of the armed forces conducted in July and August
of 2011.
A central conclusion from the study is that militaries in the
region are not yet “lost” to criminal groups. Certainly, illicit
ties between the military and criminal groups have grown in
the last decade as new criminal groups have gained presence
in the region, seeking arms, new recruits and transport
provides an extraordinarily detailed and up-to-date accounts of
Guatemalan crime groups and should be required reading.
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routes. Yet despite this growth, in most of the region the
armed forces are not more frequently embroiled in illicit
activities than their civilian peers, for instance in the police
and judicial system, or in local politics and the business
sector. Rather, support from military collaborators is one
link in a wider system of associates that criminal groups
need to rely on to maintain trafficking structures throughout
the region.
The window of opportunity that currently remains open
needs to be used as quickly as possible in the worsening
crime-and-insecurity context. Efforts need to take the entire
system of links into account. For the military in particular,
leverage mechanisms should focus on a strategic system of
rewards and punishments to deter collusion with criminal
groups – rewarding clean military units, creating new
carefully vetted ones, and in extreme cases dissolving (and
prosecuting members of) units with a record of criminal ties.
International cooperation, including strong support from the
United States, is essential, particularly in promoting
cooperation among those sectors of the military – the
region’s navies and air forces in particular – that have
generally remained “clean.”
The remainder of the paper focuses on laying out the most
significant patterns and recent developments that affect the
propensity of militaries in Central America to become (or
remain) engaged in illicit activities. The next three sections
discuss in turn Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. The
final section offers suggestions for policy initiatives that can
help to reduce opportunities for illicit relationships to
prosper in the armed forces. As Tables 1 and 2 indicate,
there are important variations in the levels of violence,
effectiveness of drug interdiction, and public perception of
security forces and policies. In particular, Nicaragua‟s
indicators present an interesting contrast to the cases of the
6

Northern Triangle and suggest that probing that case may be
particularly useful in identifying policy strategies.
Table 1. Key Indicators by Country
Country

Population
(2010)6

GNI/capita
(2009)7

Cocaine
Interdiction
(2010)9

US$ 3,370

Homicides
per
100,000
(2010)8
64.4

El
Salvador
Guatemala

6.2 million

US$ 2,620

41

Honduras

14.3
million
7.6 million

US$ 1,820

77 (2009)

Nicaragua

5.8 million

US$ 1,000

14 (2006)

7.1 metric
tons (2009)
6.1 metric
tons
17.5 metric
tons

6

126 kg

Source: United Nations.
Source: World Bank.
8
Source: U.S. State Department, except Nicaragua data from World
Bank.
9
Source: U.S. State Department, 2011 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report, country sections.
7
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Table 2. Public Opinion on Security Institutions and
Policies
Country

Do You
Trust the
Military?
(2008)10

Approval
of the
Gov’t
(2010) 12

56.5 %

Do You
Trust
the
Police?
(2010)11
49.3 %

El
Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua

Country is
Progressing
(2010)14

71 %

Approve
Gov’t
Security
Policies
(2010)13
48 %

52.9 %
51.9 %
61.5 %

31.0 %
54.1 %
54.7 %

47 %
51 %
58 %

22 %
33 %
58 %

14 %
10 %
39 %

24 %

Nicaragua: Professionalism at Risk
On many levels, Nicaragua‟s military is an outlier in the
region:
unreformed from its Sandinista roots, but
remarkably professional and apolitical, with institutional
economic interests through its legal but entirely opaque
social security fund, it consistently ranks as the most trusted
public institution in the country. 15 This is particularly
remarkable as civilians have rarely exercised effective
oversight over the military or set clear defense policy,
leaving the institution essentially autonomous from civilian
10

Percent responding in affirmative. Source: Latin American Public
Opinion Project, “Do you Trust your Armed Forces?”
AmericasBarometer Insights #27 (2009).
11
Percent responding in affirmative. Source: Latin American Public
Opinion Project, “Trust in the National Police,” AmericasBarometer
Insights # 59 (2011).
12
Corporación Latinobarómetro, Informe Latinobarómetro 2010
(Santiago, Chile: 2010), p. 79.
13
Informe Latinobarómetro 2010, p. 79.
14
Ibid. p. 18.
15 Elites rank the military even more highly than average citizens, with a
difference of about 7 percentage points. See Margarita Corral, “The
State of Democracy in Latin America: A Comparative Analysis of the
Attitudes of Elites and Citizens,” Boletín PNUD and Instituto de
Iberoamérica #1, January 2011.
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control.16 Taken together, these qualities have a significant
restraining influence on propensities to engage with criminal
groups.

16

See the account of historian Roberto Cajina, the dean of Nicaraguan
civil-military relations studies, in “Reconversión de la Defensa in
Nicaragua: Asimetrías e incoherencias,” Security and Defense Studies
Review 2 (Summer 2002), 81-101; and the conforming analysis by
former defense ministry adviser Carlos Arroyo Borgen, “De la guerrilla a
la consolidación institucional: la singular evolución del Ejército de
Nicaragua,” Atlas Comparativo de la Defensa en América Latina y
Caribe, 2010 (Buenos Aires: RESDAL, 2010), pp. 252-253.
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Military Entrepreneurship
As was true in all of the post-war transitions in Central
America, the Sandinista Popular Army sought to survive and
maintain institutional autonomy and secure resources as it
headed into the democratic, peacetime, and post-Cold War
environment. Confronted with the loss of foreign patronage,
an economy in shambles, and the opposition‟s win in the
1990 elections that the Sandinistas themselves had allowed,
army leaders anticipated the massive demobilization that
would bring forces that had once numbered over 130,000
(including reserves and conscripts) down to a professional
force of about 15,000.
While the most senior commanders of the Sandinista army
got rich through the famed piñata that allowed them to take
the best holdings in the “distribution” of state assets, 17 there
was not enough money to compensate other officers and
troops. With a need estimated at over US$ 18 million and
the military‟s new social security institute (Instituto de
Previsión Militar, IPSM) not yet funded, the army received
grants from European governments for about US$ 6.5
million that allowed thousands of officers to take a hybrid
three month course in business administration at the
prestigious INCAE graduate business school of Central
America.18 Officers also received US$1,000 as start-up
17

These were state assets – typically expropriated land and business
properties of the former regime‟s ousted Somoza clan and its allies,
compensated to them by the state but now taken by top FSLN leaders as
war booty. On the transition, see Laura Nuzzi O'Shaughnessy and
Michael Dodson, “Political Bargaining and Democratic Transitions: A
Comparison of Nicaragua and El Salvador,” Journal of Latin American
Studies 31:1 (February 1999), pp. 99-127.
18
Created in 1963 as an initiative of the Kennedy Administration with
joint sponsorship by USAID and the Harvard Business School, INCAE is
Central America‟s premier business and public administration school,
with campuses in several countries including Nicaragua. During the
Revolution, the business administration program was suspended, but the
functional administration program continued and is likely what
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capital from the government to found their own small
business, though most used the cash to pay off debts and
living expenses rather than to become overnight
entrepreneurs.19 Even so, military‟s emphasis on second
career education prevailed: in order to advance to senior
ranks, both military and police officers are required to take
degrees in a civilian profession (law, public administration,
accounting and business administration are common) and
today even critics of the military‟s involvement in economic
activities praise this innovation.20 It sets the Nicaraguan
military apart from its neighbors by preparing officers for a
second career in an occupation other than the private security
sector, which elsewhere in the region is the most common
sector to absorb former forces. The professional preparation
requirement arguably makes Nicaraguan officers less castebound and more profession-oriented – and by extension less
beholden to political cronyism.
IPSM
The military leadership‟s golden calf is the aforementioned
IPSM – not because its pensions or other benefits are
Sandinista officers studied. While I could not determine whether military
officers during the Somoza dictatorship studied at INCAE in earlier
decades (it seems doubtful), there is an interesting parallel with Cuban
military officers beginning to study (capitalist) business administration in
European schools in the 1980s, at the initiative of the longtime head of
the army, Raúl Castro who saw a need to enhance efficiency in state
enterprises that were to be managed by the reliably loyal armed forces.
For a brief overview of the Cuban case, see Kristina Mani, “Military
Entrepreneurs: Patterns in Latin America,” Latin American Politics and
Society 53:3 (Fall 2011), pp. 25-55.
19
Author interview with retired General Hugo Torres Jiménez, a former
director of the military intelligence agency and currently a leader in the
opposition Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS), Managua, July 8,
2011.
20
Author interviews with Roberto Orozco and Yassir Chavirría, defense
and security research associates at the Instituto de Estudios Estratégicos
y Políticas Públicas (IEEPP), Managua, respectively July 6 and 8, 2011.
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particularly generous, but because it enables business
relationships with enterprises owned by retired military
officers; active service officers may not be business owners,
but retired officers are often shareholders in the IPSMinvested firms or those with which they do business. Prior to
1990, no military welfare fund existed – unusual in the
region, where militaries set up such funds in earlier decades
(under Somoza, “provision” for the forces occurred through
a personalist prebend system). Perverse luck and state assets
allowed the new social security project to be funded with
seed money from the secret 1992 sale of military equipment
to both Ecuador and Peru, which were embroiled in a rivalry
and later engaged in a brief but costly war with each other.
The sales brought about US$25 million in seed money for
the IPSM equity fund.21
IPSM‟s equity fund was valued in 2004 at US$30 million
according to the little data IPSM makes public, and in 2007
at US$65 million according to a confidential
PriceWaterhouseCoopers audit.
Critics of the IPSM
structure suspect the fund, which in 2007 was heavily
exposed in U.S. stock markets, took a huge hit in the global
recession. Management of the fund follows informally
presented directives from the military high command but
remains entirely opaque, with no public auditing or
legislative or public oversight.22 In steps not countenanced
21

Entire squadrons of Mi-25 helicopters were sold to Peru, as well as
artillery and other equipment (including for Ecuador radar able to detect
the new Peruvian attack helicopters), with spare parts included. The
sales were justified later by former general and defense minister Joaquín
Cuadra as imperative in the country‟s financial situation where 10,000
officers were soon to retire without ready compensation. Roberto
Fonseca and Roberto Orozco, “7 años después, detalles inéditos de la
venta de armas a Perú y Ecuador,” Suplemento Enfoque, La Prensa
(Managua), October 27, 1999.
22
Author interviews with Roberto Orozco of IEEPP, July 6, 2011, and
Carlos Arroyo Borgen, former Defense Ministry official, July 9, 2011;
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under the law, it has taken short term “loans” from the public
sector pension fund that were later paid back quickly when
revealed in the press. In several instances reported in the
press, companies owned in part by IPSM have expropriated
(or poorly compensated) owners of property the IPSM
companies sought for real estate developments.
IPSM‟s current practices matter with respect to illicit
activities in at least two possible ways. One is that it is very
likely the opportunities for former military officers to
network into existing business relationships created through
the IPSM structure keep them quite busy in licit ventures,
maintain the promise of such ties for those still in military
service, and do not undermine the public image of
professionalism the military has carefully cultivated. The
other factor is that the fund‟s likely losses are correlated with
a significant expansion of former officers into public
administration positions during the current government of
Daniel Ortega, the longtime head of the Sandinista National
Liberation Front (FSLN) elected to the presidency in 2006.
The Ortega appointments are certainly due to bringing
retired military Ortega loyalists into key state posts (for
instance, Antenor Rosales as central bank president since
2007; and close Ortega political broker Álvaro Baltodano the
same year as director of the Free Trade Zone Commission 23),
Eduardo Marenco, “Empresarios en Uniforme: los negocios del Ejército
de Nicaragua, 1995-2007,” IEEPP research paper, 2007. The
confidential PWC audit, a copy of which the author acquired from nonmilitary sources, was commissioned by the military for its perusal – it is
summarized for the executive branch and not shared with.
23
Despite being an alliance broker for Ortega, U.S. Embassy officials
consider him to be a “voice of reason…at least on economic issues.”
U.S. Embassy Managua cable, “Nicaragua: US Ambassador Calls on
Free Trade Commissioner,” December 11, 2008. Published in La
Nación, February 6, 2011.
http://www.nacion.com/Generales/Subsitios/Investigacion/2011/WikiLea
ks/EntregaW/WIKILEAK177999.aspx
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many of the less politically connected officers who cannot
afford to retire into state posts.24
Military Autonomy in the Ortega Period
President Ortega has appointed a significant number of
former Sandinista commanders to top posts25 and other
former officers also at lower levels. Several individuals
interviewed for this project noted the military has “unwritten
rules” that military officers should not take political
appointments for at least a year even after retirement; Ortega
has interfered with this principle. This raises the concern that
the military‟s tradition of being both beyond civilian control
and beyond civilian political cooptation may fall to
politicization.
Yet overall, the military hierarchy appears to be privileging
its institutional autonomy and cohesion over political perks.
Even the current president, Daniel Ortega, has had to bargain
hard with the military – and accepted a deal that effectively
eviscerated the defense ministry and made the military
accountable only to the president.
In situations of
emergency, the military intelligence agency can now extend
its authority over civilian agencies (police, migration, border
and customs authorities, etc.). Critics rightfully see this as
enabling the “militarization of public institutions.” 26 Still,
the Nicaraguan military is quite far away from the high
24

Several individuals interviewed for this project suggested this.
For an extensive list and analysis of Ortega appointments that suggests
the president took a “big tent” rather than ideological approach to
defining them, see Francisco A. Guevara Jerez, “Who‟s Who in the New
Cabinet,” Revista Envío, February 2007.
http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/3460
26
This is the view of the country‟s main independent think tank on
citizen and state security analysis, IEEPP. For their critical assessment,
see Ary Pantoja, “Ciudadanía bajo inteligencia militar,” El Nuevo Diario
(Managua), December 1, 2010.
http://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/nacionales/89365
25
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degree of political allegiance that Venezuela‟s Hugo Chávez
has required of the Bolivarian Armed Forces.27
The Military’s Counterdrug Operations
Nicaragua is still relatively “quiet” on the drug trafficking
front, serving primarily as a refuge for traffickers when the
heat gets too strong elsewhere, rather than as major transport
hub like Honduras. Yet it is clear that drug trafficking
organizations (DTOs) are targeting the gamut of Nicaraguan
officials, including government ministers, judges,
prosecutors, legislators, police, and high ranking officers in
the military, according to the files of a now-disbanded
national police unit the United States was instrumental in
building. That unit was disbanded by Ortega, reportedly
because it had gotten too close to acting on its evidence.28
In contrast, the Nicaraguan Navy continues to work very
closely with U.S. agencies in counterdrug work; in 2010 it
confiscated over 75 percent of all cocaine seized by
Nicaraguan authorities (indicated in Table 1), much of this in
cooperation with the U.S. Navy and Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA).29 This is another indication that the military
acts in its own interests and not at the behest of the political
leadership. Lacking significantly in equipment so that it is
able to act on only about 25 percent of the information it
27

Chávez is a significant benefactor for ALBANISA, the corporation set
up to distribute Venezuelan aid at the discretion of Ortega with no
legislative oversight as would normally be required of state spending. In
the dissident wing of the Sandinista (MRS) several prominent former
Sandinista military officers are significant figures, often criticizing the
discretionary funds in the millions of U.S. dollars contributed by
Venezuela. Author interview with General Hugo Torres Jiménez.
28
“Agentes de la Unidad corrían graves riesgos,” El Nuevo Diario
(Managua), April 9, 2010.
http://archivo.elnuevodiario.com.ni/2010/04/09/nacionales/122130
29
As a U.S. DEA official interviewed for this project in El Salvador on
July 12, 2011 noted, “Ortega gets it.” See also U.S. State Department‟s
INCSR 2011, pp. 422-423.
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receives from the DEA,30 the chief of Nicaragua‟s Atlantic
Naval Command lamented in 2007 that trafficker opponents
have superior equipment like night vision and satellite
communications, which his forces lack.31
In the interim, the navy has acknowledged its forces are now
the target of criminal groups offering them money to look
the other way, in one reported case for as much as US$
50,000, and there have been cases of “friendly relations” to
DTOs within the navy‟s ranks that the leadership says it
punished.32
Such open discussion of the challenges
confronting the military is notably different than what
officials in other countries have often commented to the
press – for instance in Honduras, the defense minister has
repeatedly denied that Mexican drug boss Joaquín “El
Chapo” Guzmán operates there, despite numerous reliable
accounts of his presence. The issue is less about being
truthful than a reflection of the handle the two countries have
over their organized crime threats – in Nicaragua it may still
be manageable and discussable, but this is not the case
elsewhere in the region.
EL SALVADOR’S
BATTERED

MILITARY:

REFORMED

BUT

Of the Northern Triangle countries, El Salvador‟s military
and defense ministry officials show the most professionalism
and have been the most committed to addressing the problem
of military collusion with organized crime. The 2009
election of Mauricio Funes, of the former guerrilla
30

Author interview with Chavirría, July 8, 2011.
Bernd Debusmann, “Cocaine is King on Nicaragua‟s Caribbean
Coast,” Reuters. Jan 29, 2007.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/01/30/us-nicaragua-cocaineidUSN2326993620070130
32
“Intentos narcos de permear al Ejército,” El Nuevo Diario (Managua),
July 18, 2011. http://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/nacionales/108092
31

16

Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), ended
more than two decades of right-wing government under the
(Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) and moved the
country away from a focus on the heavy handed “mano
dura” security policies that frequently put the military back
into policing roles yet failed to curtail gang-based violence.
The U.S. government has acknowledged El Salvador‟s
commitments to security sector reforms by positioning El
Salvador to be Central America‟s leader in setting security
policy models and anti-crime initiatives.
With these
accomplishments in mind, however, the country is still far
from defeating its non-state challengers.

The Transition to Professional Forces
El Salvador‟s internationally-brokered peace accords defined
a clear and immediate reform agenda for the military in the
post-war period. Reforms, which were monitored in the
initial transition period (1991-1995) by a United Nations
17

observer mission, included limiting the military‟s mission to
national territorial defense; ending its missions in internal
security and the maintenance of constitutional order; placing
the military under the authority of a civilian-led defense
ministry; reducing military forces by half (including a purge
of forces) within the first year of the peace; and reorganizing
forces and revising their training programs to build
professionalism and respect for human rights. In addition,
there were important economic pacts in the peace: agrarian
lands and agricultural and educational credits were
distributed to former combatants from both sides of the war;
the accords also contained specific legal protections to
facilitate the former guerrillas‟ reintegration into society. 33
The Complex Challenge of Illegal Armed Groups
Today the military numbers just over 14,000 forces, less than
one-quarter of its size at the end of the war. However, as
early as the mid 1990s, the special Joint Group established
by agreement between the new Salvadoran government and
the United Nations determined that the death squads of the
war period – now purged from formal state institutions – had
reinvented themselves for the post-war period as criminal
organizations engaged in extortion, killings for hire, and a
host of drug, car and arms trafficking, and that they operated
with support from state authorities in both the civilian and
security sectors.34 So while El Salvador is typically hailed
(and compared favorably with Guatemala) for the degree to
33

Margarita S. Studemeister, ed., El Salvador: Implementation of the
Peace Accords. Peaceworks #38. Washington, DC: United States
Institute of Peace, 2001, p. 8-9.
34
The Joint Group report, Documento Especial: Informe del Grupo
Conjunto para la investigación de grupos armados ilegales con
motivación política en El Salvador, was published July 28, 1994 and is
available at http://www.uca.edu.sv/publica/idhuca/grupo.html. The Joint
Group was comprised of four individuals: the chief of the UN Mission
ONUSAL's human rights division, the country‟s human rights
ombudsman, and two lawyers appointed by the president.
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which the military, judiciary, and the police underwent
reforms in the post-war period, it too has exhibited the
presence of “sleeper cells” similar to those that have been
described as persisting in Guatemala‟s “illegal groups and
clandestine security apparatuses” (CIACS).35
The existence of such groups in post-war El Salvador was
never challenged at the time through state policies, implying
that even with the best-structured start-up conditions followthrough policies are imperative. It also emphasizes that El
Salvador‟s criminal groups are not “only” sourced from
abroad (Mexican cartels, repatriated Maras), but also involve
a significant home-grown component that will make
dismantling it (and the linkages it has to transnational
groups) very challenging without significant resources
applied in a region-wide strategy.36
Military Security Work and Issues of Exposure
Under Funes, the military has again been called into internal
security roles on an emergency basis. It currently provides
security at official border crossings, prison perimeters, and
on the streets; it has also been called in to protect the
country‟s valuable coffee sector, protecting transit to allow
growers to get goods to market.
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The UN established a special commission to examine the activities of
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For further analysis, see Douglas Farah, “Organized Crime in El
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and Olson, eds., Organized Crime in Central America, pp. 104-138.
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With the Zetas and other groups seeking to acquire newer,
high-caliber weapons, Salvadoran forces have become a
particular target. Unlike Guatemala‟s forces, where arms
sales from the United States remain embargoed, Salvadoran
forces were the beneficiaries of U.S. arms sales, particularly
in the 1980s but also in later decades. El Salvador acquired
about 266,000 M67 grenades from United States between
1980 and 1993; Salvadoran officials acknowledge that
almost all of the grenade attacks carried out by the maras
(for whom grenades are their extortion weapon of choice)
have involved M67s. In 2009 the government consolidated
remaining stocks into high-security locations, and says no
subsequent losses of grenades were reported. But many
arms are already “loose” and grenade attacks haven‟t
significantly abated in either El Salvador or Mexico, where
over 5800 live U.S.-issued grenades were confiscated
between 2007-2010.37 Several recent cases of current and
former Salvadoran soldiers trying to sell arms and military
uniforms are under investigation or prosecution.38
As a result, the military has worked hard to foster
professional discipline and cares about its international
image. For instance, the military leadership knew that the
revelation in 2011 of the Capitán case – in which a former
Salvadoran army soldier seeking to sell weapons and
explosives to Colombia‟s FARC insurgents was arrested in
the United States in a DEA sting operation – would make it
look bad, but cooperated fully in the investigation in order to
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Weapon: Cold-War Era Grenades Made in U.S.,” The Washington Post,
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deter corruption in its ranks.39 In addition, the defense
ministry has recently instituted new benefits in subsidized
housing and healthcare coverage, particularly for forces
serving on an emergency basis in public security and prison
security. The new benefits policies were triggered by the
dismissal of 42 soldiers for involvement in selling arms from
military stockpiles to criminal groups. 40 Yet as a locally
based DEA official worried, “the longer the military is in law
enforcement, the more probable corruption within it
becomes.”41
HONDURAS: POST-COUP GROUND ZERO
As a staging ground for forces in neighboring civil wars in
the 1980s, Honduras can lay claim to important stockpiles of
arms that are a hold over from those wars. Unlike its warafflicted neighbors, however, the military never experienced
the pressures of post-war “demobilization” or military
reform. The military has a long history of involvement in
the management of state-owned enterprises, many of which
were created under authoritarian rule in the 1970s in the era
when major state-sponsored development projects was in
vogue. That record translated in the 1980s, now under a
democratic regime, into significant investments by the
military‟s social security fund in major national enterprises,
much like what developed in Nicaragua but on an even
greater scale.
Yet the most important recent development – the civilianmilitary coup that ousted leftist President Manuel Zelaya in
June 2009 and ushered in a seven-month period of de facto
rule under Roberto Micheletti – has had lasting effects on the
39

Author interview with U.S. DEA official in El Salvador, July 12, 2011.
“FAES ha destituido 42 vinculados con tráfico de armas,” La Prensa
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country‟s exposure to transnational DTOs. The coup made
Honduras the political pariah in the region and brought on
the loss of U.S. counter-drug and development assistance.
Along with Micheletti‟s redeployment of the military away
from counterdrug work to repression of political protestors
and guarding of formal border crossings 42 to prevent
Zelaya‟s return, this opened the floodgates to drug
trafficking that skyrocketed after the coup. 43 As a result,
Honduras is today not only the air and sea gateway44 for
drugs entering Central America from South America, but
arguably the weakest link the region in terms of countering
the penetration of organized crime.
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While guarding formal crossings may seem useful for deterring illegal
traffickers, it is worth noting that Honduras, like its neighbors, has
hundreds of informal (illegal) crossings that are not officially monitored.
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IPM
Modeled on the Guatemalan military‟s social security fund,
and itself later copied by the Nicaraguan military, the
Honduran Instituto de Previsión Militar (IPM) has a
remarkable rollercoaster-like history. Democratization in
1984 removed the military from its formal role in politics,
but left it with other positions of power: senior military
officers in active service continued to staff government
ministries and to direct strategic state industries and public
utilities. As state assets were privatized, the IPM gained
privileged access to buy shares in public companies at
insider prices. In this way IPM assets grew dramatically in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, as it acquired controlling
interests in at least 17 major companies in sectors ranging
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from agriculture and construction, to real estate development
and banking.45
However, many of these holdings were inefficient and poorly
managed from the start, and military control via IPM appears
only to have worsened conditions. By the late 1990s, the
fund‟s solvency was in question and under pressure from
senior military officers IPM contracted an independent audit
that to this day remains unpublicized.46 The audit led to the
sell-off of numerous insolvent holdings.
Under new
direction for more than a decade, IPM is now risk averse – it
emphasizes “long-term holdings” and no longer invests
holdings directly in overseas markets. 47 Yet despite the
crisis of the late 1990s that appears to be familiar lore in
Honduran political and business circles, there is no public
information about IPM‟s investment holdings.48 IPM – a
formal, publicly funded institution that annually receives
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Arnoldo Brenes and Kevin Casas, Soldiers as Businessmen: the
Economic Activities of Central America’s Militaries (San José, CR:
Arias Foundation, 1998).
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control of the former state cement company, Incehsa, which along with
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among military and civilian elites appear to inform these observations, as
a full public record does not exist.
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over 20 percent of its capital from state and affiliate
contributions – remains exempt from basic transparency. 49
The IPM saga is a telling reflection of the military‟s
continued ability to maintain institutional privileges with
little to no civilian oversight, and of the ruling political
elite‟s disinterest in altering this arrangement. Honduran
civil-military relations basically reflect a mutual elite nonintervention pact – one that was broken during the Zelaya
government‟s repoliticization of the military, in which the
president significantly increased defense spending, expanded
the military‟s role in development and infrastructure
building, and then concluded wrongly that the military would
not resist being enlisted to oversee the controversial
referendum that became the immediate reason for the
president‟s overthrow.50
In this context, it is hardly
surprising that military officials and their civilian defense
ministry spokespersons51 frequently assert that the military is
49

It makes public operating expenses, but no breakdowns of its
investment holdings – all numbers and categories are global, not specific.
See the labyrinthine records available under “Transparencia” at
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Various interview subjects (including Zelaya sympathizers)
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clean – unlike its peers in Nicaragua or El Salvador, the
Honduran military very rarely admits to institutional
weaknesses or failings, regardless of how ample the record
in contrast stands.
“Lost” Military Weapons, the “Narco-Storehouse” and
Opportunities Following from the Coup
There have been a variety of cases of Honduran military
arms turning up in the hands of Mexican and Colombian
criminal groups, as well as reports that major drug traffickers
and their associates operate in Honduran territory, yet
civilian and military officials rarely address the veracity of
such charges and typically have denied them by assertion.
However, under increased pressure – as a variety of reports
have appeared from U.S. and Guatemalan officials,
independent academic analysts, and Honduran civil society
organizations like CONADEH reporting on the rapid
advances of criminal groups inside the country – the
government of Porfirio Lobo has recently begun to change
its tone.52
Defense Minister Marlon Pasqua has stated that the
onslaught by foreign cartels has turned the country into a
“narco-storehouse,” as major cartels, particularly the Sinaloa
Cartel and the Zetas, target Honduras for its strategic
location.53 The minister also admitted that currently a
whopping 80 percent of the cocaine reaching the United
States from South America has passed through Honduras.
There has also been in 2011 a rash of new appointments in
bureaucracies to its perspectives and reduce the chances that hard
questions will be asked.
52
Elyssa Pachico, “Post-2009 Coup, Honduras a „Narco-Storehouse,‟”
InSight Crime, September 23, 2011. http://insightcrime.org/insight-latestnews/item/1614-post-2009-coup-honduras-a-narco-storehouse
53
“Tienen a Honduras de “narcobodega,” La Tribuna (Tegucigalpa),
September 20, 2011. http://www.latribuna.hn/2011/09/20/tienen-ahonduras-de-%E2%80%9Cnarcobodega%E2%80%9D/

26

the security sector following revelations of high-level
civilian collusion with cartels. This may be a mixed
blessing, though, as the most prominent official to leave was
Security Minister Oscar Álvarez, who had been outspoken in
correctly criticizing the police for pervasive corruption; his
repeated attempts to purge the police hierarchy (resisted by
the police establishment) appear to have forced the
resignation.54
A positive sign in these developments is that overwhelming
evidence and significant pressure from the United States
apparently can bring Honduran officials to acknowledge
failings publicly and perhaps begin to address them. Yet the
problems now admitted have been brewing for years.
Already during the Zelaya government the military was
drawn away from security roles toward development
assistance, leaving important gaps in the country‟s anti-crime
policies. As a result, in 2008 U.S. officials in Honduras
expressed concerns about the “possible unauthorized
diversion, misuse, or failure to secure” light weapons (antitank guns, grenades) supplied through U.S. military
assistance programs to the Honduran forces; such arms have
been found in Guatemalan criminal stocks, particularly in the
last year, according to reports by that country‟s new and
effective attorney general.55 Still, by far it was the post-coup
54

As everywhere else in the region, crime-related police corruption by
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period that allowed cartels to breach any barriers that still
existed to their resource base, transit access, and refuge
places in Honduras.56
Corruption has been common among Honduran political
elites at all levels, and corrupt links to private business
interests that support the country‟s traditional leaders are
well known and widespread. However, the coup enabled
political and business elites to raid the spoils of the state
even more intensively than usual, according to persuasive
accounts by Honduran analysts; this was also confirmed in
wiki-leaked U.S. Embassy cables, in one of which
Ambassador Hugo Llorens described how “Micheletti and
his colleagues…appear to have cut a significant number of
back-room deals, which were egregious even by local
standards.”57
At the same time, at the local level corruption is no less
apparent. In the western part of the country, bordering
Guatemala and El Salvador, are several provinces in which
Mexican cartels (to date mainly Sinaloa) have bought land
and estates, boosting their operations there as they launder
drug profits into “legitimate” holdings. Alexander Ardón,
the mayor of El Paraíso in Copán province, is known for his
small mountain town‟s unusual level of riches, the city-wide
curfew that allows him to maintain control over his
Crime, April 25, 2011. http://www.insightcrime.org/insight-latestnews/item/814-cable-honduran-military-supplied-weaponry-to-cartels
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Corruption Surround Dam Management Concession,” February 20, 2010.
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/corrupcion/Micheletti/elpepuint/20110129elpepuint_17/Tes. The cable
describes how the outgoing Micheletti government signed a major, 25year hydro-dam concession to a consortium in which they themselves
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“kingdom” and his police-reported ties to the Sinaloa
Cartel.58 While El Paraíso‟s mayor may be the most
notorious, he is not alone in establishing protection alliances
with DTOs. There is also substantial evidence that Sinaloa‟s
notorious boss Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán not only hid out
but established a veritable operations center in the Santa
Bárbara province that neighbors Copán. From there he
allegedly contracted the December 2009 assassination of
retired General Julián Arístides González, who as head of
Honduras‟s counter-drug agency was putting pressure on the
cartel.59
Local landowners in the eastern provinces also have
established ties to DTOs. It is a well known secret than
many of the new landowners in Honduras are drug
traffickers, which is logical as landownership provides a
legitimate cover for laundering cash profits, capturing
operational space, and establishing a cover of local
legitimacy. There is also evidence that some landowners
have contracted private security by former paramilitaries
from Colombia, and therefore it is worth recalling that
Colombia‟s paramilitary successor groups are recognized as
having moved into drug trafficking since their supposed
demobilization in 2005. Following the coup in Honduras,
landowners scaled up their hiring of private security,
ostensibly to protect against peasant land seizures in the
tense political climate. The alleged hiring of former
Colombian AUC paramilitaries by Miguel Facussé to protect
his extensive African palm plantations in the eastern Bajo
58
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Aguán region drew particular attention from human rights
groups.60
Facussé is one of Honduras‟s richest and
politically most influential businessmen, whom a wikileaked 2004 U.S. Embassy cable discusses with concern
following several suspicious drug shipment drops on his
heavily guarded property. 61
All this connects back to the question of the effectiveness of
government policies against criminal groups. Landowner
“insecurity” and land rights activism have recently been used
to make the government‟s case for an expanded military
presence in the northeast and for an overnight no-fly zone
that would extend across one-third of Honduras. Most acute
is the conflict in Bajo Aguán in the coastal province of
Colón, where deadly land disputes led in August 2011 to the
deployment of hundreds of army troops to “pacify” the
region. Security Minister Oscar Álvarez asserted (without
providing any supportive evidence) that the protesters are in
fact drug traffickers seeking control of land, enabling the
military-backed police action that brought 1,000 military
troops and police into the area – and setting the stage for the
government to request the necessary congressional
approval.62
On the surface, a no-fly zone makes logical sense, given that
most drug shipments transiting from South America arrive in
Honduras by aircraft at night. However, among experts
60
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consulted for this project, several expressed concern that the
entire situation is a foil, in which governing elites are
complicit, to allow greater free movement for drug
trafficking.63 That assessment may seem to stretch beyond
rational belief, but given the extensive scale of corruption
throughout the Honduran state, it would be irrational to
simply rule this possibility out.
A significant question is whether the planned no-fly zone
would be effective and enforceable. On the one hand, there
simply are no serious anti-corruption efforts enforced by the
state.64 In the absence of enhanced state capacity to counter
corruption and crime, a no-fly strategy will at best have to be
perpetuated indefinitely to reduce the trafficking scourge.
On the other hand, it is possible to see the crisis of the
Honduran state, and its dependence on constructive foreign
assistance, as an opportunity to strengthen some institutions.
Within that portrait, the Honduran military is still
significantly less corrupted by criminal groups than the
police and other civilian public officials. As is generally true
elsewhere in the region, within the military the navy and air
force stand out as the least “exposed” and as the least
corrupted. The navy wins praise especially from U.S.
officials for being the lone effective deterrent and
interdiction force through its base in the remote far eastern
region of Mosquitia, a rainforested area extending to the
border with Nicaragua. The air force, in turn, in July of 2011
signed a promising cooperation agreement with the
Colombian air force, through which they agree to share their
63
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July 16, 2011.
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air traffic intelligence and are able to fly into each other‟s
airspace to pursue undocumented flights. The agreement
allows Honduras to benefit from Colombia‟s more
formidable experience and technology and may well have an
important external monitoring effect as each side works to
live up to the expectations of joint work under the
agreement.65
All of the components discussed above – the military‟s
continued institutional autonomy, the state‟s weak
institutions, the setbacks in counterdrug work resulting from
the coup, and a political environment in which political elites
very apparently cooperate with DTOs – make it extremely
difficult for the military to remain free of ties to illegal
groups. While there is no apparent evidence that officers are
systematically engaged with illegal traffickers, as one local
U.S. official noted in an interview, “the security policy to
date has not been effective enough to warrant attempts to coopt the military.”66 If military interdictions become more
effective, for instance through the planned no-fly zone or
cooperation with the Colombian military, then the Honduran
military will likely face greater co-optation efforts by DTOs
that need to be anticipated with institutional reforms
undertaken now.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS
The foregoing survey of the three cases shows the strong
need to pursue a comprehensive range of reforms that are not
targeted exclusively to the military. With regard to the
65
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military, though, it is crucial “open” military forces that are
hermetically sealed from civilian oversight; this is necessary
especially in Honduras, but also in Nicaragua where “selfrestraint” is a poor substitute for congressional oversight of
military holdings and practices.
The policy
recommendations offered in the next sections fall into three
categories – military, wider domestic, and international.
1) Military
Give military social safety net incentives to stay clean.
Like everyone else, the military needs a reassuringly stable,
well-run social security/medical benefit program.
In
Nicaragua, there are enough incentives to keep the vast
majority in the military away from collusion with illegal
trafficking groups: through the social security fund, but also
by enabling a future career trajectory that is not limited only
to the private security mold. However, it is crucial that
military welfare be transparently managed to enhance
efficiency– there are no national security concerns at stake,
and both military payees and the public at large that partially
funds the program should have oversight.
Require (and provide access to) higher education for
military officers to allow them to better integrate into
society after they have left military service. In the majority
of countries in the region, the only or best second career
should not be in private security. Again, this is something
Nicaragua has done well and others have not. For instance,
El Salvador was the place where the retired military officers
interviewed for this project (all of whom had reached at least
the rank of coronel and in one case the highest rank in his
service) spoke of frustration in being unable to maintain their
previous standard of living on a fixed pension, and with no
effective structures provided by the military institution to
smooth the transition.
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Last but not least, in this category also falls the
recommendation to better inventory and secure military
arsenals. Now more than ever before, military stockpiles
have become the targets of DTOs seeking military-grade
arms. Efforts to secure arsenals appear to have paid off in El
Salvador, though they were applied quite late in response to
already-high levels of theft. Countries should not leave this
crucial temptation open until the late in the game.
Create new vetted military units, phase out old ones.
Starting fresh is not a bad idea, as a USIP report on El
Salvador‟s post-conflict reforms emphasized:
The creation of a new security force usually
seems the most expensive option, and slow
and inefficient in comparison with the
option of reorganizing or restructuring
current forces. This may be so in the short
term, but in the long term it is economically
more viable and faster, because when a
force is unsound and out of control as a
result of years of abuse of power and
corruption, there is little that reengineering can be expected to do.67
Creating new units is a major investment in time and effort,
but one likely to pay back handsomely. For instance, Amaya
Cóbar has found that such units benefit from significant
political support and greater resource allocation, which
makes them measurably more effective at what they do. 68
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Guatemala is now beginning this very kind of process, under
the Police Reform Commission directed by the country‟s
leading human rights activist, Helen Mack (vetting top police
ranks, hiring new forces, and limiting promotion to those
with successful records). However, a similar cleansing has
not taken place in the armed forces. In that case, it is valid to
ask what would be more destabilizing to state and citizen
security: a strategic purge with prosecution of the military
and security forces and promotion of only thoroughly vetted
officers, or the continued “stability” of partially
compromised forces?
Monitor professions that former military, particularly
Special Forces, go into after leaving service. There is a
need to better monitor the paths that members of highly
trained units take after leaving the service. Reporting to civil
authorities should be mandatory and the highest penalties
should be raise for associations with criminal groups.
All told, procedures like these will not stop all illicit
behavior, but they can strongly de-incentivize it. Even
frustrated officers, like those in El Salvador of today,
overwhelmingly want to be identified with the integrity the
institution has evolved toward in the wake of the reforms
required under the peace accords. For instance, Carlos
Guillermo Ramos, the sociologist who directs FLACSO‟s
program in El Salvador, noted that Salvadoran officers are
typically proud of the fact that they are not tainted by illicit
ties like their peers in other countries. 69
2) Wider Circuit of Reform
Scale up the circuit of reforms to address weaknesses in
national judicial systems and police forces. The “military
problem” is impossible to address without looking at these
69
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related issues. In particular, except for clearly defined and
civilian-monitored missions in extreme circumstances, the
military should not be pulled into wholesale counter-drug
work – yet this bucks the current trend across Central
America.
While military interdiction of air and sea
trafficking is indispensible, these activities do not expose
military forces as directly to the general public (which gives
criminal groups easier access to military forces) and
especially to criminal elements and corrupt local officials
who can develop informal working relationships with
military units. It is crucially necessary to get the military off
the streets and out of local communities to reduce the
possibility for corruption in its ranks. Police should remain
the primary force deployed for anti-crime work, and where
regular police are overextended by the challenge, special
police units – anti-crime, anti-corruption – are essential.
However, this is only possible with serious reforms of
judicial systems and law enforcement – including enhanced
legal powers for prosecutors who typically achieve only 2-3
percent of conviction rates, and significant pay increase for
police to reduce the low level corruption that allows criminal
groups to thrive.70
3) International Cooperation
Build cooperative military ties among countries in the
region. Given historical animosities, rivalries, and the sticky
ideal of sovereignty, militaries in the region are particularly
hard to win over to mutual cooperation. Focusing resource
on those services in the military that are most receptive to
regional cooperation should be a priority. In particular,
70
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attention should go toward encouraging regional military
cooperation to conduct combined operations, to share
relevant intelligence, and also to monitor each other‟s
integrity and operational effectiveness.
Cooperation between like services. With this in mind, new
efforts at cooperation between specific services of Central
American militaries and their peers in other countries may be
promising. A case in point is the agreement between the
Colombian and Honduran air forces, as noted earlier.
Obviously, there is a substantial disparity between the
greater resources of Colombia‟s military and those of Central
American militaries, which is precisely why an agreement,
like the one between Colombia and Honduras, is useful.
Through it, Colombia can fly into Honduran air space if in
pursuit of a suspected drug flight, and the Honduran air force
can make use of Colombian radar and intelligence
platforms.71
Shore up and deepen ties with the most effective,
trustworthy actors. In most countries, the Navy appears to
be extremely effective because it is less “exposed” to
criminal association through policing roles. It also seems to
be the least crime-corrupted of all the services. Navies in
Central America are making sometimes-spectacular “hits”
against illegal groups. How this plays out in Mexico may be
telling. There, the Zetas have targeted navy personnel for
display kidnappings and killings (most recently in August
2011) and the following month the navy broke up the Zetas‟
sophisticated communications structure in Veracruz. The
implication is that military forces best placed and disciplined
to “stay clean” in the fight against criminal groups are likely
71 “Fuerzas Aéreas de Colombia y Honduras firman acuerdo de
cooperación,” Noticias del Aire, Aviacol.net, July 16, 2011.
http://www.aviacol.net/noticias-del-aire/avances/fuerzas-aereas-decolombia-y-honduras-firman-acuerdo-de-cooperacion.html
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to be specifically targeted for intimidation or cooptation by
those groups. National governments, as well as the U.S.
should anticipate this outcome in coordinating their military
assistance agreements in the region. Scrupulously vetting
and protecting these forces will yield added value in what are
already-costly regional security efforts to halt illegal groups.
Finally, pay closer attention to civil society organizations
and policy-oriented research centers.
These exist
throughout the region and have played an important role in
monitoring government policies and security forces‟
activities in their countries. Indeed, in the toughest case in
the region, Guatemala, it is two prominent civil society
activists – noted human rights leader Helen Mack and legal
scholar-activist Claudia Paz y Paz – who are instituting the
country‟s most promising reforms of the police and justice
system. As analysts of data-based trends and disseminators
of information, civil society organizations serve a crucial
independent oversight role in their countries. The same is
true for top-notch investigative journalists in the region who
have probed deeply into otherwise-opaque connections and
resources of public officials and their associates. In fact,
civil society organizations and journalists were an impressive
and crucial source of the data collected for this study.
The importance of civil society actors in Central America is
an indispensible sign of the promise that indeed exists in the
region for building democracy – a promise often
overshadowed by the frightening reports of criminal violence
and alarming statistics that have become the region‟s
trademark identifiers. The patient may be very ill, but no
one should be getting ready to call the morgue. Rather,
treatments must be applied that are specific to each patient
and allowed to take their course: political-institutional
reforms are always costly and rarely are completed rapidly.
Central American governments need consistent support to be
38

able to make advances in extremely difficult times. U.S.
policy needs to help them stay on course, even if progress is
slow or there are setbacks.
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